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THE MYTH OF SUPERIORITY 
William B. Rubenstein* 
Get a group of civil rights lawyers together and there is at 
least one thing they would agree upon- they prefer to litigate in 
federal, not state, court.1 Writing in 1977 from his decade-long 
experience as a civil liberties litigator, Burt Neuborne codified 
this sacred tenet in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.2 In 
The Myth of Parity, Neuborne opined that federal courts were 
systematically preferable to state courts as a forum for the pro-
tection of federal constitutional rights. Neuborne's claim ex-
ceeded the simple proposition that federal judges were more po-
litically liberal during this time period. Rather, he set forth an 
argument that federal courts were "institutionally preferable to 
state appellate courts as forums in which to raise federal consti-
tutional claims. "3 
The experience of gay rights litigators in the twenty-two 
years since Neuborne's thesis was published challenge his as-
sumptions in several interesting ways.4 Put simply, gay litigants 
seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have generally 
fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts. 
That statement poses two challenges to Neuborne's thesis. First, 
* Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful for helpful comments I 
received on earlier drafts of this article from Evan Caminker, Erwin Chemerinsky, Matt 
Coles, Peter Eliasberg, Ruth E. Harlow, Ken Karst, Nan D. Hunter, Dan Lowenstein, 
Michael Small, Eugene Volokh and Kenji Yoshino. I am particularly indebted to Steve 
Yeazell. While the ideas in this article are mine, the idea that they constituted an article 
was his. Attribute blame accordingly. 
I. Okay, they probably would also unanimously disdain the stinginess of existing 
attorneys' fee provisions, but that's another article. 
2. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). Neuborne 
has noted the universality of his thesis. See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of 
a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 797, 797 (1995) ("My perception (in 
the Myth of Parity) was hardly novel. Virtually any experienced constitutional litigator 
could-and would-have told the same tale in the 1970's."). 
3. Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1116 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added). 
4. From 1987 to 1995, I was one of these litigators, working as a staff attorney with 
the ACLU's national Lesbian and Gay Rights Project. 
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it implies that the federal courts were never institutionally better 
situated to protect disfavored claimants and that all Neuborne 
really experienced in his time as a litigator was a greater repre-
sentation of liberal judges in the federal courts. This point has 
intuitive appeal because during much of the succeeding two dec-
ades, the federal courts have largely been dominated by conser-
vative Republican appointees.5 Perhaps Neuborne's preference 
for federal courts and pro-gay litigators' preference for state 
courts simply reflect short term trends in the political orientation 
of these fora. Yet the gay rights experience might suggest some-
thing more meaningful: perhaps it reveals institutional advan-
tages of state courts in protecting individual rights that are 
missing from Neuborne's depiction of these competing fora.6 
I. THREE PARITY DEBATES 
Since the founding of the Republic, controversy has sur-
rounded the proper role of the federal courts and their relation-
ship to state courts in a federal judicial system.7 A central con-
cern has been how cases involving federal rights, particularly 
federal constitutional rights, are allocated between these two 
judicial systems. Is a federal forum a necessary adjunct for the 
enforcement of a federal right? Or can state courts be trusted to 
protect federal rights? The constitution's Madisonian Compro-
mise enables federal issues to be litigated in state courts, while 
simultaneously authorizing Congress to establish inferior federal 
courts as a forum for the litigation of federal questions and en-
5. By 1993, Republican presidents had appointed 75% of the sitting federal judges. 
Sec Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The FiTIIlllmprint, 76 Judicature 282, 297 
(1993). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 593,594 
(1991) (stating that in the 1990s the "parity debate appears old and futile. With conser-
vative Reagan and Bush nominees dominating the federal bench, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that federal courts are more likely than state courts to protect constitutional liber-
ties"). 
6. This point is especially important in that Neuborne himself, though acknowl-
edging the conservative makeup of the federal judiciary, continues to advocate its institu· 
tiona I advantages. See Neuborne, 44 DePaul L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note 2) ("I continue 
to believe that a relative institutional advantage for the plaintiff exists in federal court"). 
7. A brief history is set forth in Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining 
A Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233, 239-55 (1988). Regarding the 
meaning of this history, compare Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitu-
tional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605,606 (1981) (arguing that state courts have 
been prime protectors of constitutional rights "in an unbroken line from the Federalist 
Papers down to today's Supreme Court opinions") with Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
Rev. 205, 230 (1985) (arguing that the Framers distrusted state courts and gave federal 
courts the preeminent role in defending federal rights). 
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suring that the Supreme Court can have the last word on all de-
terminations of federal law. 
The constitutional structure that permits both state and fed-
eral courts to rule on federal issues sets the stage for the parity 
debate. At the center lies a comparison between the institu-
tional competence of state and federal courts: those who believe 
federal courts institutionally superior argue, on this basis, for an 
expansion of federal jurisdiction,8 while others resist on the 
grounds that state courts are institutionally comparable to fed-
eral fora. 9 The parity debate arises in a variety of doctrinal con-
texts/0 and has been especially palpable for the past half-
century.11 
Dubbing the argument in favor of state court competence 
"the myth of parity," Burt Neuborne stepped into the debate in 
1977 with a ringing and influential12 endorsement of the superi-
ority of federal fora. Neuborne's federal-forum-preference the-
sis emanated from his practice experience. 13 But the preference 
also responded to growing Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting 
federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions. In 
fashioning that jurisprudence during the 1970s, the post-Warren 
Court justices relied upon the proposition that state courts are as 
institutionally capable of protecting federal constitutional rights 
8. Neubome's article, cited in note 2, is seen as the preeminent expression of fed-
eral superiority. 
9. Classic defenses of state courts include Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (cited in 
note 7), and Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Fed-
eral and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
213 (1983). 
I 0. These include: the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state court convic-
tions, see, e.g., Stone 11. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); the ability of federal courts to enjoin 
state court proceedings, see Dombrowski 11. P{tster, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and/or the ex-
tent to which they should abstain in deference to ongoing state proceedings. see Younger 
11. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Wisconsin 11. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); the preclu-
sive effect that state court judgments should be granted in later federal proceedings, sec, 
e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 11. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Allen 11. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90 (1980); and the availability of relief under federal civil rights laws such as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g., Patsy 11. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
II. Chemerinsky attributes this to three late-20th century developments: the appli-
cation of the federal constitution to the states; the Warren Court's expansion of individ-
ual liberties; and state resistance to civil rights. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 
242-43 (cited in note 7). See also Chemerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 594-98 (cited in note 
5) (describing federalism dynamics that gave rise to parity debate in mid-20th century 
jurisprudence). 
12. Chemerinsky asserts that Ncubome's article "spawned much of the academic 
literature on parity" between its publication in 1977 and 1990. Chemerinsky, 71 B. U. L. 
Rev. at 598 (cited in note 5). 
13. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115 (cited in note 2). 
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as are their federal counterparts.14 Neuborne argued that "three 
sets of reasons support a preference for a federal trial forum:" 15 
First, the level of technical competence which the federal dis-
trict court is likely to bring to the legal issues involved gener-
ally will be superior to that of a given state trial forum. Stated 
bluntly, in my experience, federal trial courts tend to be better 
equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of 
authority and more likely to produce competently written, 
persuasive opinions than are state trial courts. Second, there 
are several factors, unrelated to technical competence-
which, lacking a better term, I call a court's psychological 
set-that render it more likely that an individual with a 
constitutional claim will succeed in federal district court than 
in a state trial court. Finally, the federal judiciary's insulation 
from majoritarian pressures makes federal court structurally 
preferable to state trial court as a forum in which to challenge 
powerful local interests. 16 
Given this understanding of the comparative advantages of 
federal courts, Neuborne viewed the Supreme Court's increasing 
14. The locus classicus of this premise is a footnote in Justice Powell's decision in 
Stone v. Powell: 
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the view that fed-
eral habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the Fourth Amendment 
stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent forums for 
the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state 
courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through fair 
application of the [exclusionary] rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this 
view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective institutional settings 
within which federal judges and state judges operate. Despite differences in in-
stitutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional 
claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there 
now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the 
trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, 
have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold 
federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreo-
ver, the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying federal consti-
tutional law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial level judges in both sys-
tems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal 
judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with re-
spect to the [consideration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in 
the state courthouse." Bator, [Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963)] at 509. 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976)). Sec also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
u.s. 592,610-11 (1975). 
15. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1120 (cited in note 2). 
16. Id. at 1120-21. For a point-by-point refutation, sec Solimine & Walker, 10 
Hastings Const. L.Q. at 225-32 (cited in note 9); James M. Fischer, Institutional Compe-
tency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation Between 
State and Federal Courts, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 175, 184-96 (1980). 
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reliance on state courts-premised as it was upon the myth of 
parity-with suspicion and concern: "to the extent that constitu-
tional cases can be shifted from federal to state trial courts, the 
capacity of individuals to mount successful challenges to collec-
tive decisions will be substantially diminished. "17 
Neuborne's text provides perhaps the strongest argument of 
federal court superiority. But it also provides a useful site at 
which to disentangle three aspects of the parity debate. For 
some judges and scholars the debate revolves around forum al-
location-defining the proper role of the federal courts in a fed-
eral system and identifying what courts should hear what issues 
in what manner. 18 For others the parity debate has operated as a 
discourse about forum selection, helping to describe how lawyers 
might consider what court system to enter if a choice between a 
federal and state forum exists.19 Thus, Neuborne began his con-
sideration of parity in the latter voice-" As a civil liberties law-
yer for the past ten years, I have pursued a litigation strategy 
premised on two assumptions. . . . "20 - but framed his conclu-
sions in the former voice, "It is the recognition of [federal court 
superiority in safeguarding individual rights] and its troubling 
ramifications for the viability of constitutional rights-and not 
an uncritical assumption of parity-which should be the critical 
factor in current federal-state allocation decisions."21 Still a third 
strand of the parity debate emerges from Neuborne's article: the 
question of whether the institutional arguments for or against 
parity merely provide a seeminglX neutral discourse meant to 
mask naked political preferences. 2 Neuborne's distrust of the 
neutral discourse of "forum allocation," led him to write that all 
such talk might be a "pretext for funneling federal constitutional 
decisionmaking into state courts precisely because they are less 
17. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1131 (cited in note 2). 
18. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniell. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, eds., 
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System chapter IV (Foundation 
Press, 4th ed. 1996); Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of 
Judicial Power (Michie Co., 2d ed. 1990). 
19. For an overview on forum selection, see generally Note, Forum Shopping Re· 
considered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990). 
20. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115 (cited in note 2). 
21. ld. at 1131. Like Ncubome, most commentators collapse these various strands. 
For example, Solimine and Walker, who undertook an empirical study of case outcomes 
to address questions of forum allocation, also usc their data to address questions of fo-
rum selection. Sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 240 n.l21 (cited in 
note 9). 
22. See Michael Wells, Behind The Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process 
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B. U. L. Rev. 609, 611 (1991 ). 
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likely to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal consti-
tutional doctrine. "23 Here Neuborne implies that beyond forum 
allocation and forum selection, the entire parity debate might be 
a mere mirage: i.e., the debate may be nothing more than each 
side's desire to identify seemingl,y neutral procedural rules that 
will achieve its substantive goals.2 
Much subsequent scholarship has sought to find a way out 
of the parity debate. Erwin Chemerinsky has labelled as "futile" 
attempts to resolve the non-neutrality allegations25 and the fo-
rum allocation debate/6 arguing that we should instead focus on 
enriching the forum selection opportunities available to constitu-
tionallitigants.27 Chemerinsky contends that the parity debate is 
unresolvable both because there are no commonly-accepted cri-
teria by which to measure the performances of the competing 
fora,28 and because, even were there, there is no acceptable 
methodology for assessing the court systems' adherence to these 
criteria.29 His emphasis on maximizing forum selection subtly 
23. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1105-06 (cited in note 2). 
24. Neubome's desire that constitutional doctrine be "vigorously enforced" is itself, of 
course. a normative decision that may not be shared by all. But the "parity debate is politics" 
scholarship is not criticizing the parity debaters for their orientation toward constitutional en-
forcement. Rather, this strand of the parity debate is criticizing the debaters for wrapping their 
political preferences in what they pretend are neutral-sounding principles, while simultaneously 
believing that the neutral-sounding allocation decisions that they espouse will yield particular 
case outcomes which they favor. 
25. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note 7) ("Arguing about the 
true motivations of those who believe in state court superiority will do nothing to resolve 
this impasse."). 
26. Chemerinsky's characterization of the parity debate as non-resolvable is nicely 
captured by Professor Redish's characterization of Chemerinsky's thesis: 
So much has been written by both jurists and scholars over the last twenty years 
on the issue of state and federal court "parity" that it has been difficult to 
imagine at this point anything new being said or some important and original 
insight being discerned. What I failed to anticipate, however, was the important 
and original insight that there was nothing new to be said on the issue. 
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment 
on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 329, 329 (1988) 
(footnote omitted). 
27. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 300-26 (cited in note 7). 
28. See also Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of 
Judicial Power 2 (1990) ("it would be difficult to devise a system of measurement which 
could be used to answer" the question of whether "federal courts are better equipped to 
guard federal interests than their state counterparts"); Fischer, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. at 
180-84 (cited in note 16). 
29. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 255-80 (cited in note 7). Martin Redish 
disagrees about the futility of resolving the debate; Redish asserts that the institutional 
factors, particularly popular election of state judges, render federal courts obviously 
more favorable tribunals for the resolution of federal rights. See, e.g., Redish, 36 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 334-35 n.21 (cited in note 26) ("When the issue is the constitutional 
protection of minority rights against majoritarian encroachment, [the majoritarian con-
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shifts the debate away from arguments about which forum is 
"better" and toward a presumption that constitutional rights are 
best protected if widely enforceable.30 By contrast, Martin Re-
dish has argued that the forum allocation issue is non-debatable 
because, given Congressional authority to channel federal litiga-
tion as it sees fit, the Supreme Court had less discretion in the 
matter than the debate requires.31 Finally, Michael Wells has at-
tempted to unmask the substantive sub-text of the debate, argu-
ing that it is in fact a debate about outcome, not procedure.32 
Despite desires to resolve the parity debate, it is unlikely to 
fade away. Forum allocation questions will endure so long as 
our constitutional structure continues to allow federal cases to 
be heard in inferior federal courts and state courts. Similarly, fo-
rum selection, or forum shopping, will remain a "national legal 
pasttime"33 so long as lawyers can choose between at least two 
fora for the resolution of any claim. And, of course, there is no 
foreseeable end to the inquiry of whether procedure and sub-
stance are distinct entities such that we could discuss, in any ra-
tional way, the substantive neutrality of procedure. 
Nothing in the following pages "settles" the parity debate. 
Little will provide much insight about proper forum allocation. 
Indeed, I would agree with Professor Chemerinsky that empiri-
cal evidence-particularly anecdotal empirical evidence of the 
type that follows-sheds little light on forum allocation deci-
sions.34 Yet both sides of the parity debate re~ularly summon 
anecdotal narratives to support their positions.3 By describing 
trol of state judiciaries] is sufficient to render dubious any claim to meaningful judicial 
independence in such a context."). 
30. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at303-10 (cited in note 7). 
31. Redish argues that much of the parity debate ought to be subsumed by separa-
tion of powers doctrine, in that Congress has carefully dictated the answers to many par-
ity questions (especially those involving abstention), which the Supreme Court has ille-
gitimately ignored. Sec Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the 
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L. J. 71 (1984). See also Fischer, 34 U. Miami L. 
Rev. at 196-211 (cited in note 16). But see Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is 
Wrong About Abstention, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 1097 (1985); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). Redish's responses can be found in Redish, 36 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at345-60 (cited in note 26). 
Akhil Reed Amar offers a weaker version of a similar point, arguing that forum al-
location is essentially dictated by the Constitution's command that the Supreme Court 
have the final word on all matters of federal law, regardless of which court system they 
originated in. Sec Amar, 65 B.U. L. Rev. at205 (cited in note 7). 
32. Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at609 (cited in note 22). 
33. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 
13 Wayne L. Rev. 317,333 (1967). 
34. Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 255-79 (cited in note 7). 
35. Compare Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115-16 (cited in note 2) (describing 
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the experiences of pro-gay litigators, I hope to enrich the forum 
selection aspects of the parity debate with a unique, yet perhaps 
generalizable, perspective. 36 
II. AN UNCONTROLLED EXPERIMENT: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF GAY RIGHTS LITIGATORS 
Most gay rights litigators grew up in the tradition from 
which Neuborne wrote.37 They initially assumed, therefore, that 
federal courts would be more receptive to gay claims than would 
state courts. A series of First Amendment cases involving the 
associational rights of gay student groups in the 1970s supported 
this assumption.38 But a long line of unsuccessful federal cases 
challenging discrimination a~ainst gay people cast doubt upon 
the federal forum preference. 9 Most centrally, the federal courts 
how his practice experience supported federal forum preference) with Bator, 22 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. at 630 (cited in note 7) (stating that: "State supreme court justices as a 
group arc as well paid and have as much prestige as federal judges. Those that I have 
met seem to me to be as expert on issues of federal constitutional law as arc federal 
judges."'). 
36. See Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 609, 611 (cited in note 22) ("The real point of con-
tention between the two sides is not parity, but rather the litigating advantage enjoyed by 
the party who is allowed to try the case in its chosen forum."). 
37. Neubomc was a staff attorney with the New York Civil Liberties Union from 
1967-1972, then the Assistant Legal Director of the ACLU from 1972 to 1974. After 
spending several years in legal academia-during which he authored the Myth of Par-
ity-Neuborne returned to the ACLU as its Legal Director from 1983 to 1986. Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 732 (Foundation 
Press, 1998-1999). 
The ACLU was the principal litigator of gay rights cases until several gay-specific 
public interest law firms (National Gay Rights Advocates and the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights in San Francisco; Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders in Boston; 
and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York) grew in size during the 
mid-1980s. Many gay rights lawyers in the United States continue to have close connec-
tions to the organization and to the basic federal court presumption that Ncubome ar-
ticulates. For a brief history, sec William B. Rubenstein, In Communities Begin Respon-
sibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar, 48 Hastings L. J. 1101 (1997). 
38. See Gay Lib. v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 
sub nom., Ratchford v. Gay Lib., 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Mat-
thews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of New Hampshire v. 
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay 
State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn 1979); Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 
(N.D. Ga. 1972). The federal courts' protection of First Amendment rights in this con-
text was affirmed in later years as well. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 
F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997); Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th 
Cir. 1988); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985). I discuss these cases in further depth, see text accompany-
ing notes 93-97. 
39. For example, nearly every federal circuit has rejected constitutional challenges 
to the military's anti-gay policies. For citations, see William B. Rubenstein, ed., Cases 
and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The Law 663-66 (West Publishing Co., 2d. ed. 
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did not offer constitutional protection against state sodomy 
laws,40 an experience which culminated in the Supreme Court's 
finding no federal constitutional violation in Georgia's criminali-
zation of private, consensual, adult, sexual practices between two 
41 
men. 
Following the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
pro-gay litigators were forced to move their sodomy law chal-
lenges across the street to the "inferior" state courts and to rely 
on state constitutional protections.42 But a funny thing happened 
after arriving at the disfavored forum: victory. Since Hardwick 
was decided in 1986, four state high courts have struck down 
their state sodomy laws on the grounds that these laws violate 
state constitutional norms.43 More remarkably, these decisions 
1997). The federal courts have rebuffed constitutional challenges to employment deci-
sions in a variety of other contexts as well. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. 
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (security clearances); Padula v. Web-
ster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Federal Bureau of Investigation); Rowland v. Mad 
River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (high school counselor), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (library 
employee). 
40. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), 
affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summarily affirming decision of three judge district court that 
Virginia sodomy statute was constitutional); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(en bane) (reversing district court decision and upholding constitutionality of Texas sod-
omy law), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). 
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
42. Neuborne had foreseen this change, attributing it to an institutional characteris-
tic of the federal judiciary-a greater responsiveness to Supreme Court command. Thus, 
Ncubornc wrote: 
If, as I believe, federal courts are more responsive than state courts to Supreme 
Court commands, contraction of federal constitutional rights by the Supreme 
Court will be rellected quickly at the district court level. If so, civil liberties 
lawyers may be forced to turn increasingly to state courts in hopes of protecting 
individual rights under state constitutions. 
Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1121 n.59 (cited in note 2) (internal citation omitted). 
In a host of other important cases, pro-gay litigators had no choice: many family law 
issues had to be litigated in state fora, while many federal issues, such as challenges to the 
military's policy, had to be litigated in federal fora. Sec Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
397 (1872) (limiting jurisdiction of state courts over federal officials). 
43. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 
487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. Stare, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996), permission to appeal denied. A number of lower state 
courts have reached.similar results. Sec Stare v. Smith, 729 So.2d 648 (La. App. 1999) 
(finding state sodomy law violates state constitution's right to privacy); City of Dallas v. 
England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding sodomy law unconstitutional); Stare 
v. McGovern, 1998 WL 252236 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 1998) (finding state sodomy law 
violates state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Williams v. Glendening, No. 
98036031/CL-1059 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Oct. 15, 1998) (finding state sodomy law not 
applicable to private, consensual, adult, same-sex conduct); Michigan Organization for 
Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820 CZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., July 9, 1990) (hold-
ing sodomy law unconstitutional). But sec Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) 
(en bane) (upholding constitutionality of Missouri sodomy law against federal and state 
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come from states-Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Montana 
(and intermediate appellate courts in Texas and Louisiana)-not 
exactly at the cutting edge of liberal politics. Yet these state de-
cisionmakers have been anything but irresolute. Consider the 
derisive tone of the Kentucky Supreme Court, writing six years 
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick: 
To be treated equally by the law is a broader constitutional 
value than due process of law as discussed in the Bowers case. 
We recognize it as such under the Kentucky Constitution, 
without regard to whether the United States Supreme Court 
continues to do so in federal constitutional jurisprudence. 
"Equal Justice Under Law" inscribed above the entrance to 
the United States Supreme Court, expresses the unique goal 
to which all humanity aspires. In Kentucky it is more than a 
• • 44 
mere asp1rat10n. 
Family law has provided a second locus for some surpris-
ingly empathetic decisionmaking on gay issues. Hawaii supplies 
the prime example. Its Supreme Court rendered a remarkable 
1993 decision that the state's ban on same-sex marriages consti-
tuted sex discrimination, to be subjected to the highest judicial 
scrutiny.45 New York's high court, in 1989, ruled that a gay male 
couple was the legal equivalent of a family, protecting a surviv-
ing gay man from eviction from his lover's rent controlled 
apartment upon the lover's death from AIDS.46 California's 
courts have enabled same-sex couples to enforce living-together 
contracts of the type recognized by the state high court in 
Marvin v. Marvin. 47 
Beyond these issues involving same-sex couples, state courts 
have provided a substantial measure of protection for gay par-
ents. Most state courts now claim that they prohibit sexual ori-
entation from being a factor in child custody and foster care de-
cisions, absent some specific showing that the parent's 
orientation is harmful to the child. Though the standards are 
malleable, and not always followed, the situation has improved 
dramatically in the past 20 years.48 Many state appellate courts 
constitutional challenges). 
44. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501. 
45. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
46. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
47. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The state appellate courts acknowledged the exis-
tence of Marvin-like claims in cases involving same-sex couples in Whonon v. Dilling-
ham, 202 Cai.App.3d 447 (1988) and Jones v. Daly, 122 Cai.App.3d 500 (1981). 
48. For an overview, sec Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation 
and The Law at 808-11 (cited in note 39). 
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have permitted a gay or lesbian life-partner to adopt a lover's 
children ("second parent adoptions"), thereby creating numer-
ous families throughout the United States in which children are 
being raised by two legal parents of the same sex.49 
Finally, state high courts have issued some of the strongest 
statements concerning sexual orientation discrimination. Cali-
fornia's Supreme Court held sexual orientation discrimination to 
be a violation of the state's constitution nearly 25 years ago, si-
multaneously ruling that "coming out" was protected political 
activity under the state labor code.50 And the highest court of 
the District of Columbia held that sexual orientation discrimina-
tion warrants the strictest form of judicial scrutiny, analogizing 
its protections in D.C. law to those of race discrimination.51 
The careful consideration accorded by state courts in manrz 
of these gay rights cases has few federal court counterparts. 2 
49. See id. at 866-74. See generally, Sonja Larsen, Adoption of Child By Same-Sex 
Partners, 27 A.L.R.5th 54 (Lawyers Cooperative Pub., 1995). 
50. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
Sec also Collins v. Faith School Dist. No. 46-2, 574 N.W.2d 889 (S.D. 1998) (protecting 
school teacher from dismissal based on discussion of homosexuality); Morrison v. State 
Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (holding that teacher could not be fired for homo-
sexual conduct under immorality clause absent some nexus to his job performance). This 
earlier California ruling has a contemporaneous federal court counterpart in Norton v. 
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
51. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987). Al-
though the District of Columbia court system is federal in nature, the judges are not Ar-
ticle III judges. 
52. Outside the First Amendment arena, there arc only a handful of federal appel-
late court decisions ruling in favor of plaintiffs in gay rights cases since !977, most of 
which have emanated from the Ninth Circuit. Sec Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 
856 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1796 (1998) (selective prosecution of lesbian 
articulates equal protection claim); Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (per-
secution on the basis of sexual orientation in Russia grounds for asylum in the United 
States); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (anti-gay harassment in high 
school states equal protection claim); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 
1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (Congressional statute bars discharge of gay scrvicemcmber on basis 
of statements alone); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991) (military must ar-
ticulate rational basis to support anti-gay policy); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (military equitably estopped from discharging openly gay 
servicemember), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). 
The instances in which federal appellate courts have reversed affirmative federal dis-
trict court decisions are, by contrast, almost too numerous to list. Sec, e.g., Able v. 
United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing district court decision on military 
issue); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 
(6th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court decision striking down Cincinnati ballot initia-
tive); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (reversing panel decision in 
favor of gay soldier); Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623 (lOth Cir. 1992) (reversing district court 
decision holding sexual orientation discrimination to be suspect); High Tech Gays v. De-
fense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court 
decision in favor of gay security clearance applicants); Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. 
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For example, several years after the Hawaii marriage case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the firing 
of a lesbian attorney by the Georgia Attorney General because 
she and her partner had a private, religious marriage ceremony.53 
After a panel of the Eleventh Circuit had deemed the firing a 
violation of the attorney's freedom of association,54 the full Elev-
enth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. The prime example of the 
court's disengagement from the constitutional issues at hand can 
be seen in its dismissal of the plaintiffs equal protection argu-
ment: "the record supports no reasonable inference that the At-
torney General revoked Shahar's offer because of her sexual 
orientation-as opposed to her conduct in 'marrying' another 
woman."55 
It would be an exaggeration to suggest that state courts have 
been uniformly supportive of gay rights and federal courts uni-
formly opposed. The sheer number of state courts,56 and the 
higher ,Proportion of gay-specific cases that end up in state 
courts,5 has led to a host of unsympathetic decisions in those 
fora.58 Moreover, the federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court in Romer v. Evans,59 have sometimes accorded protections 
Dist .• 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing jury decision in favor of fired bisexual high 
school counselor), ccrt. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (en bane) (reversing district court decision striking down Texas' sodomy law), 
cert. denied,478 U.S. 1022 (1986). 
53. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 693 (1998). 
54. Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated upon grant of reh'g en 
bane, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
55. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1111 n.27. 
56. As Neubomc recounts, "There arc about twice as many trial judges in Califor-
nia as in the entire federal system." Ncubomc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1121 & n.60 (cited in 
note 2). 
57. Sec text accompanying notes 74-80. 
58. See, e.g., Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (affirming 
constitutionality of state sodomy law); Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987) 
(affirming constitutionality of ban on gay adoption as rationally related to government 
interest in limiting number of homosexuals in society); State ex rei. Grant v. Brown, 313 
N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1974) (affirming refusal of state official to grant corporate charter to 
gay organization on grounds that "promotion of homosexuality as valid life style is con-
trary to the public policy of the state"), cert. denied sub nom,. Duggan v. Brown, 420 U.S. 
916 (1975). 
59. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Though Romer is surely an example of a favorable federal 
court ruling on gay rights, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is hardly "eloquent and 
technically precise." Ncubomc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1123 (cited in note 2). Various 
scholars' attempts to divine a general principle underlying the decision are evidence of 
the ruling's abstruseness. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Essay, Attainder and Amendment 
2: Romer's Rightness, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996) (arguing that the Bill of Attainder 
Oause "clarifies and supports" the majority's theory in Romer); Daniel Farber and 
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const. Comm. 257 (1996) (arguing that Romer 
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for pro-gay positions, most notably in the First Amendment 
cases discussed above.60 I also doubt that state courts would 
handle some gay rights cases, such as the military challenges, any 
more sympathetically than federal courts have. 
Nonetheless, the record just rehearsed supports at least two 
statements. The federal courts have not proved uniformly more 
hospitable to civil rights claims. And state courts have not abdi-
cated their responsibilities to civil rights claimants. But more 
important than the scorecard, the gay rights experience suggests 
some insights into the institutional competence of state courts 
not evident in Neuborne's account. 
evolves from a "firmly rooted" principle in existing constitutional law that "forbids the 
government from designating any societal group as untouchable''); Jane S. Schacter, 
Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1997) (providing a 
normative foundation for Romer grounded in democratic theory); Louis Michael Seid-
man, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 67 (placing the Romer decision in the context of debates about judicial activism 
and arguing that Romer is both radical and conservative-like the Warren Court itself). 
The same is true of the Court's decision in another case of importance to gay rights 
advocates, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Though On-
cale-the victim of same-sex sexual harassment-was not himself gay, his case had the 
support of gay rights groups who argued that the same-sex nature of the sexual harass-
ment Oncale faced should not remove it from the protections of Title VII. Sec, e.g., 
Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al., Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., 1997 WL 471805 (filed Aug. 11, 1997). Though the Court's outcome 
permits the prosecution of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII, Justice 
Scalia's opinion sidesteps as many issues as it answers. 
My point here is not that state courts are more elegant than federal courts. I am 
simply attempting to cast doubt upon Ncuborne's contention that federal courts compose 
more technically proficient opinions than their state counterparts. Neither Romer nor 
Oncale were graceful opinions. 
60. Sec text accompanying note 38. Sec also Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 
(5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional the firing of a public em-
ployee for proposed testimony in favor of civil rights for homosexuals, as testimony held 
to be protected speech not interfering with operation of office); Acanfora v. Board of 
Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that school teacher's media appearances con-
cerning homosexuality were protected speech that did not disrupt his workplace, but up-
holding his firing on other grounds); Glover v. Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 20 F. Supp.2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that non-renewal of teaching con-
tract because of sexual orientation violates federal equal protection clause); Weaver v. 
Nebo School Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that firing of lesbian 
teacher/volleyball coach violated first amendment and equal protection clause); Fricke v. 
Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980) (upholding First Amendment right of male high 
student school to take male date to prom); Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. 
Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) (finding teacher's public statements about homosexuality did 
not disrupt workplace and thus employment safeguarded by First Amendment). 
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III. SOME NOTES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETENCE OF STATE COURTS 
Neuborne identified three characteristics of the federal 
bench that, he contended, yielded systematically better results 
for civil liberties claimants: competence, mindset, and insulation 
from majoritarian pressures. In the context of gay rights claims, 
each of these factors favors state courts (or, at a minimum, does 
not favor federal courts). The state courts' record on gay rights 
issues thus emerges as a systemic, rather than political, result. 
A. TECHNICAL COMPETENCE 
Federal courts rarely involve themselves in domestic rela-
tions and probate matters. These matters are creatures of state 
law and are typically litigated in specialized state courts. The 
predilection for the state forum in these cases is so strong that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Congress' grant of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases not to encompass do-
mestic reactions.61 
This jurisdictional limitation insulates federal courts from a 
primary site at which gay peogle (as gay people) interact with 
the legal system: family courts. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexu-
als appear in divorces, custody, and visitation decisions, as well 
as in the growing number of cases involving the formation and 
dissolution of gay families.63 State judges, particularly family 
court judges, therefore deal with gay issues on a regular basis in 
a real world context. A family court judge might be asked to de-
cide whether it is in the best interests of a child to be placed in 
the custody of a gay or non-gay parent. She has probably heard 
gay and bisexual people testify about their lives. She may have 
had to confront and analyze testimony about the nature of ho-
mosexuality or about the relationship between sexual orienta-
tion and parenting ability. She has had to weigh her biases con-
cerning homosexuality in the trenches. Even if she has not had a 
gay-specific case, the family court judge regularly makes deci-
sions about what is in "the best interests of the child." Because 
of the fact-bound nature of such decisionmaking, a state family 
court judge would appreciate the difficulty of making sweeping 
pronouncements about parenting abilities. 
61. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
62. For a fuller discussion, see text accompanying notes 74-80. 
63. See generally, Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The 
Law at 801-918 (cited in note 39). 
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Given this institutional familiarity, I would generally prefer 
to argue a case concerning gay parents in a state court than in a 
federal court. In considering a forum for a constitutional chal-
lenge to a statutory ban on gay foster care or adoption,64 I would 
argue for a state trial court over a federal trial court. Such dis-
criminatory state laws act to cabin state trial judge discretion. 
State trial judges appreciate how much discretion they need in 
employing the "best interests" standard and they will hardly be 
shocked that gay people are parents-even parents who often 
deserve custody or visitation. Make a federal case out of this lo-
cal family law issue, however, and you risk gulling a panel of 
federal judges, who, from their "ivory tower" lack the nuanced 
instincts necessary to comprehend the values at issue in the 
case.
66 
I helped to represent an HIV-infected woman in South 
Carolina in the late 1980s.67 She had been incarcerated in the 
state mental health facility without any due process whatso-
ever-she was literally picked up off the street by the state 
health agency and sent to the mental health facility because the 
health agency feared she was spreading HIV through the sharing 
of needles and/or prostitution. When called into the case, the 
ACLU adopted a Neubornian attitude-we filed a habeas cor-
pus petition on behalf of the woman in federal court. In writing 
the petition, we carefully checked state law and learned that 
there was no statutory habeas corpus proceeding in the state 
courts in such a situation, thus arguably making the federal fo-
64. The state of Florida is currently the only state that retains an explicit ban on gay 
adoption. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (1997). The New Hampshire legislature re· 
cently repealed its ban. See 1999 New Hamphsire Laws Ch. 18 (H.B. 90) (effective July 
2, 1999), available in Westlaw, 1999 NH H.B. 90 (SN). Many states have regulations or 
informal policies making it more difficult for lesbians and gay men to adopt or become 
foster parents. See Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation and The Law 
at 863, n.5 (cited in note 39). 
65. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1125 (cited in note 2). 
66. The New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision on this precise issue, Opinion of 
the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987), as well as some decisions from Florida appellate 
tribunals, Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 
App. 1993) (en bane), affd in part and rev'd in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995), weaken 
my argument slightly. In these cases, the state appellate courts did not demonstrate the 
sensitivity I suggest state court judges would. However, this may indicate an institutional 
distinction between appellate and trial courts more than it confirms a similarity between 
federal and state courts. Moreover, the primary point of my argument is that in forum 
shopping, litigants ought not automatically favor a federal tribunal. That particular state 
courts do not perform ideally in particular cases does not undermine the thrust of this 
thesis. 
67. A fuller rendition of the case appears in William B. Rubenstein, Law and 
Empowerment: The Idea of Order in the Time of AIDS, 98 Yale L.J. 975,984-86 (1989). 
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rum our only choice. Upon arriving at the federal court (in Co-
lumbia's Strom Thurmond Courthouse) on the day of the hear-
ing, we were confronted by a Reagan-appointed federal district 
court judge who wanted nothing to do with the case. Notwith-
standing the obvious federal constitutional violation by state of-
ficials, the federal judge refused to act, directing us to the state 
courts to exhaust non-existent state court remedies. So far, this 
story may show nothing more than a Neubornian bias by the 
civil liberties lawyers and a conservative bias by the federal 
court. 
But what happened next is telling: upon crossing the street 
to state court, we were assigned to a state judge with an entirely 
different reaction. He was appalled that the state would have 
acted in such a flagrantly unconstitutional manner. Had we met 
a politically liberal judge? Perhaps, but more pertinently, we 
had met a judge who handled competency proceedings on a 
regular basis-he knew the statutory requirements for due proc-
ess in these situations and appreciated the gravity of the state's 
error. Arguably a more liberal federal jurist would have been 
equally responsive, but the enormity of the disparity between 
what was legally required and what was actually done in the par-
ticular case was far more palpable to the jurist seasoned in these 
cases. 
Neuborne appreciated the precise distinction I rely upon 
here, but drew a different conclusion from it: he described the 
day-to-day experiences of state judges as "cynicism-breeding," 
fearing that they "foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional 
rights."68 Federal judges, Neuborne opined, because of their dis-
tance "from the pressures and emotions generated by the appli-
cation of constitutional doctrine" are more likely to produce "a 
generous reading and vigorous enforcement of constitutional 
rights. "69 The story I tell here challenges this assumption. It cer-
tainly does not prove that all state judges are better situated to 
approach civil rights cases. But it does suggest that day-to-day 
experiences can breed institutional advantages, as well as disad-
vantages.70 
68. Neubome, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1125 (cited in note 2). 
69. ld. at 1125. 
70. See also, Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 634 (cited in note 7) ("The elitism of 
the federal bench, its distance from much of the daily grind of the administration of jus-
tice, its specialization -all of these are advantages, but they arc disadvantages too."). 
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B. PSYCHOLOGICAL SET 
There are several characteristics of state judges-that they 
may more regularly interact professionally with gay people, that 
they are at the same level in our federal structure as their legisla-
tive counterparts, that their decisions are geographically 
bounded, and that there are a lot of them- which together cre-
ate significant opportunities for civil rights lawyers. (Utilizing 
Neuborne's terminology, I will refer to these attributes of state 
judges as their "psychological" set, though neither of us utilize 
that term in a clinical fashion.) 
First, as to familiarity: state courts' interactions with lesbi-
ans and gay men not only give them substantive expertise that 
might make them institutionally better situated to rule favorably 
for gay people. Such interactions also breed familiarity with les-
bians, gay men, and bisexuals. One would hope that familiarity 
would in turn produce tolerance, if not acceptance, and hence 
lead to more favorable outcomes. This point is slightly different 
from the first point: there I suggested that a state judge's general 
familiarity with family law might make her more understanding 
of the problems of gay discrimination in that setting. Her back-
ground might provide this substantive advantage because she has 
actually heard gay cases. But whether she has or not, she appre-
ciates the general subject matter area in a way a federal judge 
may not. My point in this sub-section is more gay-specific: here I 
mean to suggest that state judges are more likely to have en-
countered and dealt professionally with gay people themselves. 
And I assume that such personal interactions make bias less 
likely. 
A few examples will help illuminate the point. When, in the 
late 1980s, the ACLU embarked on an effort to challenge the 
constitutionality of Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, we 
considered the various fora in which such a case might be 
lodged. One axis of decisionmaking pitted the state courts (trial 
and appellate) against the Florida federal district courts, Elev-
enth Circuit, and Supreme Court. Within each system, there 
were also geographic distinctions to consider. After selecting the 
state court system, we lodged an initial action in the state judicial 
district encom~assing Key West, Florida. Our hypothesis, 
proven correct, 1 was that a state judge in Key West would have 
71. See Seebol v. Faire, No. 90-923-CA-18 (16th Judicial Circuit, Monroe County, 
Florida, Mar. 15, 1991) (holding state law unconstitutional). Because the state did not 
appeal this decision, its affirmative outcome was isolated to Monroe County. The deci-
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a familiarity with gay people that would work to our client's fa-
vor in the case. When New York's high court ruled in 1989 that 
a gay couple was the legal equivalent of a family,72 the court was 
split into three camps-a plurality of three, a concurrence, and 
two dissenters. All three of the judges in the plurality (Titone, 
Kaye, Alexander) were from New York City, as was the concur-
ring judge (Bellacosa), while both dissenters (Simons, Hancock) 
were from upstate.73 Each of these examples involves geographi-
cal comparisons among state court judges-not between state 
and federal court judges-but the examples nonetheless demon-
strate my general point: that a judge's familiarity with gay people 
might affect her sympathies. It follows that if state judges are in-
stitutionally situated so as to interact with gay people more often 
~han federal judges, then they might systemically have less bias 
m gay cases. 
I would guess that the three primary ways gay people inter-
act with the legal system in which their sexual orientation might 
be put at issue is in family law cases;74 criminal cases;75 and as ju-
rors.76 Because of this fact, state judges in their judicial capacity 
are far more likely to have dealt, in a professional environment 
sion is reprinted in William B. Rubenstein, ed., Lesbians, Gay Men, and The Law 517-22 
(New Press, 1993). 
72. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
73. Chief Judge Wachtler had recused himself. 
74. Family law cases constitute, by far, the largest category of reported case law 
concerning gay people, a fact that is striking in that family law cases are infrequently re-
ported. Yet as a person's sexual orientation is not generally visually identifiable, it is un-
derstandable that it would emerge as an issue most often in the area of law most intrusive 
into the personal realm. 
75. Men with same-sex sexual desires have long been a subject of the criminal law. 
See generally, Nan D. Hunter, Sherry! E. Michaelson, and Thomas B. Stoddard, The 
Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Gay Person's Rights 118-
31 (1992). Police throughout the United States have traditionally arrested men for en-
gaging in sexual activities in quasi-public places. Whether or not these men claim a gay 
sexual identity (many are married), their activities bring their sexuality to the regular 
attention of local state prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. 
More recently, criminal justice agencies have been charged with collecting statistics 
on sexual orientation-related hate crimes. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). These agencies have had to develop policies for the re-
porting and handling of anti-gay bias. 
76. A person's sexual orientation can emerge in the jury box either if it has some 
relevance to the case at hand or if the basic voir dire questions provoke information re-
lating to it. See generally, Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section 
Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 231 
(1998). When I served on a civil jury in San Francisco, I was asked to stand in open court 
and describe where I lived, with whom, and whether I was married. In responding to 
these questions, my sexual orientation was revealed (as was that of a number of other gay 
men and lesbians in the pool, as well as that of many married and unmarried heterosexu-
als). 
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and in a professional manner, with lesbians and gay men.n 
Moreover, many of these state judges are former state prosecu-
tors. They are more likely to have encountered lesbians and gay 
men in routine local criminal cases or in hate crimes statistic 
collection than would their federal counterparts, many of whom 
spent their careers prosecuting federal crimes or representing 
corporate clients. Often, state judges are local political figures. 
As such, they probably have responded to a myriad of gay issues 
and interacted with gay (and anti-gay) political groups. Finally, 
many state judicial ethics codes bar bias on the basis of sexual 
orientation while the federal code of judicial ethics does not.78 
And state court systems have taken a tentative lead over their 
federal counterparts in studying bias on the basis of sexual orien-
tation in the profession and at the bar.79 These developments 
add to the mindset of the state jurist an aspirational edict that 
gay people be treated fairly in the courtroom. 
All of these institutional differences suggest that many state 
court judges will have a familiarity with lesbians and gay men 
and with gay issues not necessarily shared by their federal coun-
terparts.80 That familiarity might tend to make gay people less 
exceptional and gay rights cases less shocking to state courts 
than to federal courts. 
A second aspect of the state judge's psychological set that 
renders her institutionally preferable to a federal court concerns 
77. There are also more openly-gay state judges than the single openly gay federal 
judge. See William B. Rubenstein, Queer Studies II: Some Reflections on the Study of 
Sexual Orientation Bias In the Legal Profession, 8 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. 379, 401-2 
(1998). Cf. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and The 
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682, 1698 (1991) (arguing that the "less visible rela-
tionship between women and the federal courts is supported by pervasive ideological, 
legal, and sociological assumptions and actions"). 
78. See Jennifer G. Brown, Ethics and Equal Protection: Anti-Bias Rules as an Im-
perfect Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
79. Sec generally Rubenstein, 8 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. (cited in note 77). Judith 
Resnik makes a similar point about the relationship between the federal and state courts 
regarding gender bias: 
Those who governed the state courts developed a sense of urgency about the 
relationship of courts to women. After inquiry, many state task forces con-
cluded that women were "denied credibility" in courts and faced "a judiciary 
undcrinformed about matters integral to many women's welfare." Yet that ur-
gency to study bias against women was not shared by those who governed the 
federal courts. 
Resnik, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1690 (cited in note 77) (footnotes omitted). 
80. This conclusion cries out for a further exploration of the ways in which lesbians, 
gay men, and bisexuals might become more visible in the federal courts. Compare Res-
mk, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1700-29 (cited in note 77) (discussing "women's places in 'the 
federal courts"'). 
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her relationship to her state legislature. No matter what forum 
they select, plaintiffs in constitutional cases face an enormous 
countermajoritarian hurdle when asking a court to set aside a 
legislative enactment. But plaintiffs who pursue such a challenge 
to a piece of state legislation in federal court double their bur-
den-they complicate the separation of powers concern with a 
federalism concern. Now they are not only asking a judge tore-
verse a legislative enactment, they are asking a federal judge to 
reverse a state legislative enactment. The federal courts' sensi-
tivity to this concern, only heightened during the Rehnquist era, 
suggests that state judges have one less institutional barrier when 
reviewing state legislative enactments than do their federal coun-
terparts. 
The fact that a state court is reviewing state legislation or 
executive action suggests yet another institutional advantage-
the consequences of its decision are geographically bounded. 
Plaintiffs' attorneys might prefer a victory in federal court on 
federal constitutional grounds as it would have wider effects. 
The opposite outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick would, for exam-
ple, have eliminated sodomy laws throughout the United States 
in one decisive swoop. But for that very reason, federal judges 
may be more hesitant in their rulings. 
A final advantage of state courts is that the sheer quantity 
of state judges suggests, in a country as diverse as ours, that the 
opportunities for exceptional positions are greater. Only one 
state supreme court has ever accepted the notion of same-sex 
marriages, the decision was rendered by only three judges, and it 
cut against a large body of contrary case law. Nonetheless, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr constituted a momen-
tous turning point for the gay rights movement.81 Neuborne 
notes that the federal bench is drawn from a "homogenuous" so-
cioeducational class, one he believes makes federal judges more 
apt to be protective of constitutional values.82 Yet that very ho-
mogeneity restricts opportunities for exceptional, even deviant, 
pronouncements. For a small and relatively new social move-
ment, securing outlying but affirmative rulings may be more 
productive than attempting to secure an unattainable national 
consensus. A single court ruling can make the previously un-
thinkable suddenly real. 
81. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
82. Neubornc, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1126 (cited in note 2). 
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C. MAJORIT ARIAN PRESSURES 
Neuborne argued that majoritarian pressures worked 
against civil rights and that federal courts, best insulated from 
such pressures, would best protect civil liberties.83 This is too 
simple a picture. Majoritarian pressures on state courts can of-
ten make these courts more- not less- institutionally responsive 
to minority claims. 
True, the need to be reelected sometimes requires judges to 
trim their legal sails to the prevailing winds.84 But political proc-
esses are typically far more complicated. For those running for 
office, voters, not "public opinion," is what counts. In areas 
where a minority group has some political presence, a judge 
might need to solicit the support (or at least ensure against the 
opposition) of that minority, even though it is only a minority. If 
the concern about majoritarian pressure is that judges will de-
cide cases to get votes, in some places state judges might decide 
. h d 85 cases wit an eye towar s gay voters. 
83. See also Redish, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 333-38 (cited in note 26) ("Can one re-
alistically suggest that we can trust the independent judgment of [elected state judges] in 
cases challenging the constitutionality of state action?"). 
84. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,386-87 (1821), Chief Justice Mar-
shall expanded on this concept, noting that "In many States the judges arc dependent for 
office and for salary on the will of the legislature. . . . When we observe the importance 
which [the Constitution] attaches to the independence of judges, we arc the less inclined 
to suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional questions to tribunals 
where this independence may not exist." But as defenders of state courts point out, the 
premise is refuted by the many countcr-majoritarian decisions state courts routinely 
make. See generally, Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale 
L.J. 227,248-49 (1972). 
85. I am indebted to my colleague Dan Lowenstein for pointing out that this propo-
sition would be especially likely in situations in which an issue would be visible enough to 
be noticed by gay people (or at least politically-active gay people), but not so highly visi-
ble as to attract the attention and interest of the public generally. Some gay-specific 
family law issues would seem to fit into such a category. Openly gay people might well 
be aware of a local judge's record in custody or visitation cases or in granting second par-
ent adoptions to gay parents. At the same time, the general public would probably not 
even be aware of the existence of such issues. 
This is not to suggest, as does Justice Scalia without any empirical support, that: 
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in dispropor-
tionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income, and of 
course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public 
at large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both lo-
cally and statewide. 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-46 ( 1996) (Scalia, J.. dissenting) (citations omitted). My 
contention is far narrower: that in certain carefully defined situations. a discrete and insular mi-
nority group might have more political power on a local level than would conventionally be ex-
pected and thus might occasionally benefit rather than suffer from an elected judiciary. See 
generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985) (arguing 
that "anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty and sexual discrimination" may be more worthy 
of judicial protection from majority rule than discrete and insular minorities). 
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Second, this political point has a significant corollary-state 
judges hobnob with local political groups, particularly local bar 
groups, while their federal counterparts have no need to. The 
annual dinners of local gay bar associations can become bogged 
down by the recognition of each state court judge in attendance. 
The judges are there, in part, to keep their electoral fences in or-
der. They may also be there because they desire the backing of 
the constituent bar association as they ascend the ranks of the 
state judiciary. Sometimes they are there simply because they 
are politicians and this is what politicians do. But no matter why 
they are there, once they are there, they become more informed 
about the gay community, including its issues, its leaders, and its 
lawyers. Whether this translates into favorable judicial rulings 
or not, it ought to contribute to familiarity with gay geople that 
would make extreme anti-gay legal rulings less likely. 
Third, federal judges' insulation from political develop-
ments can be harmful if political trends are developing in ways 
that are helpful to one's cause. Life tenure implies less turnover 
and may translate into an older federal judiciary. With an 
emerging social group like lesbians and gay men, it is likely that 
younger judges will harbor fewer unreflective biases. In one of 
the gay-related military challenges, a federal district court judge 
referred to the plaintiff as a "homo. "87 It is not surprising to 
learn that the judge was in his 80s at the time. That judge would 
be unlikely to be sitting on a state court bench. 
Lesbians and gay men do not constitute a significant voting 
bloc. They might therefore be at great disadvantage in a system 
of elected judges. But gay issues are rarely the direct subject of 
judicial elections. The highest profile example of such an elec-
tion concerned the removal of a Texas state court judge after he 
made anti-gay comments in sentencing the killers of a gay man.88 
State judicial candidates may well reflect the general attitudes of 
their constituents, but it is difficult to identify directly negative 
consequences to gay people flowing from the fact that state 
judges are often elected.8 Against this presumption must be 
86. Sec Part III(B). 
87. For reference to the incident, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 60 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
88. See Anti-Gay Dallas Judge Wins Another Term, Seattle Times A2 (Mar. 15, 
1990), available at 1990 WL 3203101. 
89. Indeed, it is rare that any political issue affects the re-election of state court 
judges, who are retained by voters about 98-99% of the time, hence "judges rarely decide 
cases with an eye to electoral review." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, 
and The Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 369, 372 
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weighed the positive consequences of judicial elections outlined 
above90 and the fact that federal judicial appointments have 
brought us anything but a civil rights-friendly judiciary. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Pro-gay litigants have met with surprising success in state 
courts in the past decades. The sodomy law cases, coupled with 
the Hawaii marriage decision and some related family law cases, 
suggest that state courts can be hospitable fora for civil rights 
cases. I have suggested that the gay rights experience highlights 
some institutional strengths of state fora-substantive expertise, 
human familiarity and a psychological set receptive to constitu-
tional challenges, and a sensitivity to political change. I draw no 
conclusions from these observations whatsoever about how 
Congress or the Supreme Court ought to allocate cases between 
state and federal courts. The conclusion I do draw is that civil 
rights attorneys generally should do what gay rights attorneys 
specifically have done: abandon an automatic presumption in fa-
vor of federal courts and weigh the available opportunities in 
state courts in light of this history. 
Although this account provides a more complicated picture 
of forum selection decisions than N euborne drew in 1977, sev-
eral qualifications must be noted. First, I have somewhat elided 
the distinction between federal constitutional claims and state 
constitutional claims. In its purest form, the parity debate con-
cerns whether state courts can be trusted to enforce federal con-
stitutional rights. Most of the pro-gay state court rulings that I 
discuss have relied on state constitutional (and non-
constitutional) norms. In this sense, the story I tell here might 
simply serve as proof of the importance of state constitutions, an 
(1988); sec also id. at 371 n.7 (citing studies demonstrating that judges are generally re-
tained about 98-99% of the time). Chemcrinsky states generally: 
Electoral accountability only undermines state judicial independence if state 
court judges fear that voters will use their decisions as the basis for casting their 
votes. But how many cases are of sufficient visibility to influence votcrs'l Re-
alistically, it is unlikely that many cases arc decided differently because of fear 
of voter rejection at the next election. In fact, it appears that few voters arc 
able to distinguish between judges in retention elections. 
Chcmerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 599 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted). For a sympa-
thetic review of the social science literature, sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings Const. 
L.Q. at 230-32 (cited in note 9). 
90. It might seem contradictory that elected judges associate politically with gay 
groups even though their retention hinges little on these groups' acceptance. Yet many 
of these judges seek to move up through the ranks of the state judiciary, an ambition 
which can be influenced by organized bar groups. 
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argument made by Justice Brennan in the same volume of the 
Harvard Law Review as Neuborne's Myth of Parity.91 But there 
is an inherent tension between the Brennan and Neuborne the-
ses-it is unlikely that state courts would simultaneously be 
sympathetic to state constitutional ar~uments and unsympathetic 
to federal constitutional arguments. Hence even if the rela-
tively positive experience of pro-gay litigators in state courts 
does not directly contradict Neuborne's thesis, it nonetheless 
significantly weakens it. 
I have made a second noticeable adjustment to Neuborne's 
thesis to make my point: Neuborne wrote primarily of federal 
civil liberties claims, while I have discussed issues that primarily 
concern civil rights and family law. On civil liberties issues in-
volving gay people-e.g., First Amendment claims-the federal 
courts have been remarkably solid, as Neuborne suggested they 
would be.93 But from this I draw an important conclusion: if fed-
eral courts enjoy an institutional advantage with regard to civil 
liberties issues, perhaps state courts have some institutional ad-
vantages in safeguarding group rights when equality claims are 
involved.94 Why would this be the case?95 Liberty claims, for ex-
91. Sec William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). See also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and 
State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1141 (1985); 
Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 StJohn's L. Rev. 399 
( 1987): Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States· Bill of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. 
Rev. 379 (1980). The fact that a number of landmark federal constitutional decisions 
were long pre-dated by state constitutional rulings provides further proof of the impor-
tance of state constitutions. Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court struck 
down the state's miscegenation laws in 1948, Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), 
nearly 20 years prior to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
92. But sec Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting federal constitu-
tional privacy challenge to prohibition on same-sex marriage while accepting state consti-
tutional equal protection challenge). 
93. Sec text accompanying notes 38 & 60. 
94. It is interesting to note that Solimine and Walker's empirical survey found a 
similar disparity. In civil cases, federal courts upheld First Amendment claims 53.8% of 
the time, while state courts upheld such claims only 40.3% of the time. By contrast, in 
civil cases, federal courts upheld Fourteenth Amendment claims 32.8% of the time, while 
state courts upheld such claims 28.7% of the time. sec Solimine & Walker, 10 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. at 243-44 (cited in note 9). Federal courts had a slight advantage in both in-
stances, but a statistically significant advantage only in the First Amendment arena. 
Though I make this observation about their data, I would not defend Solimine and 
Walker's methodology in light of later critiques. Sec, e.g., Chemerinsky, 36 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. at 261-69 (cited in note 7). But sec Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, State 
Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 Harv. J.L. Pub. Pol'y 127 (1989) (re-
sponding to critics). 
95. Cf. Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 631-32 (cited in note 7) (asking whether 
federal judges arc superior to state judges on questions of civil liberties only, and not, 
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ample free speech claims, are often brought on behalf of icono-
clastic individualists undertaking provocative acts. Neuborne 
makes a strong argument that the insulation and scholarly tradi-
tion of federal judges may make them more intellectually re-
sponsive to such claims. Equality claims, however, are brought 
on behalf of social groups. In the case of gay people, the social 
group is widely dispersed throughout the population, is organ-
ized electorally in some geographical areas, and reappears regu-
larly in certain portions of the legal system. The repeat nature of 
gay issues in family courts may create institutional advantages in 
state courts.96 Moreover, the imbeddedness of the gay rights 
struggle in on-going political processes creates opportunities in, 
as well as disadvantages from, elected state fora. State judges 
not only handle gay issues and interact with gay people more of-
ten than federal judges, but, perhaps most importantly, these in-
teractions are often at a deeper and more meaningful level of 
engagement than those between gay people and federal judges. 
A federal judge ruling on a first amendment claim is engaged in 
an abstract intellectual enterprise. A family court judge ascer-
taining the best interests of a child has her hands in the guts of 
day-to-day gay family life. The opportunities for pro-gay socie-
tal change may be much greater in such settings.97 These factors 
distinguish the equality plight of lesbians and gay men from the 
liberty concerns of random individualists. 
The argument suggests that state courts have the potential 
to be more hospitable to group claims if the group at issue enjoys 
certain critical organizational characteristics: if legal issues cen-
tral to the group are regularly litigated in state courts and if 
group members are electorally organized and are able to utilize 
the ballot box. If I am correct, these criteria would help explain 
the disparate experiences of civil rights litigators and women's 
perhaps on other constitutional questions). 
96. See generally Marc Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y. Rev. 95 (1974). 
97. Following the intellectual lead of Michael J. Sandel, see Moral Argument and Liberal 
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality. 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1989), a number of scholars have 
recently argued that pro-gay advocates should engage in, rather than bracket, moral forms of 
argument in legal discourse. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation. Morality. and the 
Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237 ( 1996); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations For a 
Discourse On Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism. 85 Geo. L.J. 1871 
(1997). See also Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights. Thick and Thin. 49 Stan. L. Rev. 45 (1996); 
Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History 
of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights. 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643 (1993). The types of issues liti-
gated in state courts may afford such opportunities more easily than do the abstract legal princi-
ples with which federal judges are, conventionally speaking. most comfortable. 
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rights supporters in state courts. Blacks in the South in the 1950s 
were systematically denied the opportunity to vote, not permit-
ted to organize politically, and were disproportionately poor and 
unable to influence judicial elections. Women appear regularly 
in family law cases in state courts, vote in high numbers, and are 
widely dispersed throughout the socio-economic strata. Judith 
Resnik has suggested that these types of factors help explain why 
state courts have responded more quickly to issues of gender 
bias than have the federal courts.98 These criteria can also help 
explain why, and when, state courts have an institutional advan-
tage with regard to group-based equality claims, similar in nature 
to federal court superiority regarding liberty claims.99 
While my experience leads me to qualify Neuborne's as-
sessment of institutional advantages, both of our conclusions 
need to be further qualified: We must ask when and whether 
such institutional factors outweigh straightforward political con-
siderations. Whatever their alleged institutional advantages, the 
federal courts have proved unsympathetic to a wide variety of 
civil liberties and civil rights concerns because of the political 
ideology of those who have appointed and confirmed federal 
judges for the past several decades. Similarly, gay litigants may 
have had more success in state courts recently not because of the 
institutional factors I spell out here, but simply because the 
judges in these fora reflect a broader ideological spectrum. 
Given the complicated mix of institutional competence, po-
litical orientation, and other forum selection factors,100 I would 
not suggest that my argument be read as an inevitable presump-
tion in favor of a state forum in civil rights cases generally, or in 
gay cases specifically. A litigator would be remiss were she to 
abandon a careful analysis of both the political character and the 
institutional characteristics of the forum choices available. I can 
imagine many situations in which I would prefer a particular 
federal court to a particular state court. 101 In making this analysis 
in the future, though, I hope litigators will take into account the 
institutional advantages of state courts discussed in this article. 
98. Resnik, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1683·1700 (cited in note 77). 
99. See generally Donald J. Farole, Jr., Interest Groups and Judicial Federalism: Organ-
izational Litigation in State Judiciaries (Praeger, 1998) (on the role of interest groups in rights 
litigation). 
I 00. For example, a litigant might select a particular forum because of the speed with 
which her claims will be addressed; if this is a primary concern, it could trump ideology or 
institutional competence in certain circumstances. 
101. See generally Chemerinsky, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 605 (cited in note 5). 
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If in so doing, they abandon an inevitable presumption in favor 
of federal fora, I will have accomplished my goal.102 
V. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts have hardly provided a haven from dis-
crimination for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals during the past 
quarter century. Conversely, state courts have reached some 
rather remarkable results in gay rights cases. The superficial ex-
planation for this disparity lies in the character of the judges ap-
pointed by Ronald Reagan and George Bush. In this piece I 
have attempted to explore the possibility of a more subtle expla-
nation: namely, that state courts might enjoy some institutional 
advantages in the resolution of civil rights claims. The explora-
tion leads me to urge civil rights litigators generally to abandon a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of federal courts and to consider 
the possibility of a rebuttable presumption in favor of state 
courts. Such a conclusion may seem heretical, as the superiority 
of federal courts has been a sacred tenet of civil rights litigators 
for decades, handed down from generation to generation. But, 
to paraphrase Holmes, civil rights lawyers' notions about forum 
selection cannot persist from blind imitation of the past.103 
102. Apologies to Kenji Yoshino, from whom I learned how to conclude an article. 
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and 
the Case of" Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 Yale L.J. 485,571 (1998). 
~~~·. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,469 (1897) (stating 
that [1]t IS revoltmg to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was 
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of 
the past."). 
